

Between Geopolitics and Anti-Geopolitics: Czech Political Thought

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This article examines the role of geopolitics in modern Czech political thinking. It draws on the distinction between geopolitics and anti-geopolitics to argue that the dominant tradition of Czech political thinking is anti-geopolitical. This anti-geopolitics is presented by a review of four central figures of Czech political thought since the nineteenth century (Palacký, Masaryk, Nejedlý and Havel). However, it also shows that geopolitics represents an important undercurrent in Czech political thinking which tends to dominate for brief periods of turmoil. Three such periods are addressed: the early 1920s, the late 1930s and the early 1990s.

INTRODUCTION

The concepts of *geopolitics*, and *Central and Eastern Europe* have seemed quite natural bedfellows since the early 1990s.¹ The fall of the Soviet bloc, the disintegration of several formerly communist states and the eastern enlargements of NATO and the EU have frequently been addressed in geopolitical terms by Western observers. Moreover, geopolitical thinking (re)emerged in the region itself, providing a possible alternative to the previously unchallengeable Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. This post-communist geopolitics raised a keen interest in the traditions of geopolitical thinking in Central Eastern Europe, as well as in the role of geopolitics in their current politics.² However, the research has focused on Russia while mostly ignoring other Central and Eastern European countries.³

This article helps fill this gap by examining Czech geopolitics. It traces geopolitical ideas in modern Czech political thinking from its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it looks into the geopolitical

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dimensions of Czech political and academic discourse since 1990. On this basis, it argues that despite the dominant tradition of Czech political thinking not being geopolitical, geopolitics represents an important undercurrent in the thinking which tends to dominate for brief periods in times of turmoil.

I take four steps to substantiate this claim. First, I specify how geopolitics and its opposite anti-geopolitics are understood in the paper, pointing to geopolitics as one of the default theories of international relations. Second, I review four central figures of Czech political thinking (Palacký, Masaryk, Nejedlý and Havel) to argue that its mainstream has been shaped by ideas that are not geopolitical. Third, I look into the most important contributions to Czech geopolitics in the interwar period, presenting them as reactions to political instability and uncertainty. Finally, by examining geopolitics in the 1990s I argue that geopolitical arguments reached a peak during the division of Czechoslovakia, and have been fading away since then.

GEOPOLITICS AND ANTI-GEOPOLITICS

To study the role of geopolitics in the Czech political discourse, I introduce the distinction between geopolitics and anti-geopolitics. This enables me not only to specify which geopolitical ideas are present in the discourse but also to assess the significance of geopolitics as compared to its non-geopolitical alternatives.

Geopolitics means many, often contradictory, things. Any attempt to come up with a definition of geopolitics is therefore bound to be contested.⁴ Given that I examine a particular national geopolitical discourse in the long run, I draw on the definition of geopolitics as “a policy-oriented discourse about a state inspired by its position on the map”, which Wusten and Dijkink use in their long-term study of German, French and British geopolitical discourses.⁵

Geopolitics usually claims to provide an impartial perspective on international politics, free from ideology and any discursive factors in general. Its self-proclaimed objectivity is supposedly guaranteed by its focus on the objective and enduring conditions captured by the map. In this sense, geopolitics is “a foil to idealism, ideology and human will”.⁶ It is a part of the realist tradition of international thinking,⁷ relying on determinist discourse, which analyses politics as a result of unchanging, geographical and/or cultural features. In this respect geopolitics conceptualises the realist struggle for power more specifically as a struggle for territory.

This conservative, determinist discourse has as its foil “anti-geopolitics”.⁸ Anti-geopolitics sheds light on the ideological nature of geopolitics, hidden behind its claims of its own objectivity and impartiality. From a geopolitical point of view, anti-geopolitics represents a subversive discourse which

emphasises the social role of ideas, human agency, and the possibility of profound social change transcending the straitjacket of objective conditions.

So geopolitics is often presented as the ideology used and abused by the state, whereas anti-geopolitics is attributed to dissidents who challenge it.⁹ However, this does not always have to be the case, as anti-geopolitics can also be used by the state power. Gorbachev's New Thinking is a nice example of state-sponsored anti-geopolitics. Dijkink notices the absence of "the geopolitical reflex" in the official Soviet discourse in the last years of the Soviet Union.¹⁰ He puts this absence down to the paradigm of New Thinking which replaced the (neo)Stalinist paradigm of Empire. New Thinking was anti-geopolitical, considering geopolitical expansion and empire-building as outdated and, instead, focused on human resources and multilateral approaches, while being initiated from the very top of the Soviet state.

Similarly, the political discourse of Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was also to a large extent anti-geopolitical. Nijman speaks about her "denial of geopolitics", arguing that Albright seemed "intent on silencing the role of geography in foreign policy" while embracing "a voluntaristic perspective" instead.¹¹ He contextualises her position within the tradition of American foreign policy "idealism", which he contrasts with the European tradition of *realpolitik*. This distinction again overlaps to some extent with the distinction between anti-geopolitics and geopolitics as I understand it.

However conceptually clear these distinctions are, they often get blurred in actual discourse analysis. Thus Nijman shows that even though the thrust of Albright's discourse is anti-geopolitical, she occasionally uses geopolitical arguments too, representing "a peculiar blend of 'American' and 'European' foreign policy traditions."¹² Any operationalisation of the distinction between geopolitics and anti-geopolitics has to take such "blends" into account, addressing both of the two categories in the discourse, even if it is only one person's discourse, as a matter of shades of gray rather than black or white.

These blends are particularly likely to occur in the anti-geopolitical discourse. There are at least two reasons for this. To start with, reflection on the facts of physical, political or cultural geography is often unavoidable in foreign political discourse, no matter how universalistic and idealist the speaker's aspirations. In this respect, changes on the map can be expected to make geopolitical discourse more prominent.

Moreover, geopolitics tends to be sedimented in the political discourses of political communities, including most European nations. Geopolitics, like political realism, contributes to what is usually seen as the common sense on international politics.¹³ One can distinguish between *practical* geopolitical reasoning "of a common sense type"¹⁴ and theory-based *formal* geopolitical reasoning. In this practical capacity, geopolitics provides taken-for-granted claims about international relations, and serves as one of the

default theories of international thinking. So geopolitics can be difficult to completely avoid in most foreign policy discourses, even if their overall spirit is anti-geopolitical.¹⁵

CZECH POLITICAL THINKING: AN ANTI-GEOPOLITICAL TRADITION WITH A GEOPOLITICAL FLAVOR

I argue that anti-geopolitics plays an important part in Czech political thinking, representing a key dimension in the thought of its most influential figures. This argument is substantiated in three steps. To start with, I divide modern Czech political history into four periods: the late Austrian monarchy (pre-1914), democratic Czechoslovakia (between the two world wars), communist Czechoslovakia (during the Cold War) and the renewal of democracy (post-1989). Following this, I identify four major political and intellectual figures, whose ideas reflected and shaped the periods: František Palacký (1798–1876), Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937), Zdeněk Nejedlý (1878–1962) and Václav Havel (b. 1936).

Finally, in examining their ideas I conclude that anti-geopolitics dominates geopolitics in their arguments. This conclusion is based on the distinction between the descriptive and normative parts of their arguments. As expected, I come across blends of anti-geopolitics and geopolitics in their works and speeches. However, geopolitical arguments, if present at all, tend to appear when these figures describe what they consider political realities. In contrast, their recommendations (and all of them were active enough politically to try to put them into effect) tend to be based on anti-geopolitics. Therefore, with respect to their discourses, geopolitics may be considered either as an unavoidable received wisdom, which speakers use to drive home their point, or as a bleak backdrop of reality, against which the need for anti-geopolitics should become obvious.¹⁶

František Palacký: Founding Father

František Palacký is considered the founder of Czech historiography, and his work¹⁷ still informs the prevailing understanding of Czech history. Moreover, he exercised considerable influence, both direct and indirect, on Masaryk, Nejedlý and Havel.

On the one hand, Palacký uses geopolitical reasoning quite frequently. His Herderian conception of Czech history as a never-ending engagement between Slavs and Germans¹⁸ refers to a geopolitical struggle for living space. Similarly, he understands the Austrian empire as a geopolitical shelter of the Danubian space against Ottoman expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and against Russian and Prussian expansion since the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, Palacký's main assertion, that the greatest achievement in Czech history is the reformation of the Church, is deeply anti-geopolitical. He argues that the Hussite movement of the early fifteenth century represents the greatest Czech contribution to humanity, and an ultimate benchmark in Czech political evolution, after which the Czechs have experienced a decline. Palacký considers Jan Hus's attempt at reformation of the Catholic Church as an avant-garde of the European reformation a century later. On this basis, he interprets the Hussite movement in universalistic terms as an early advocate of humanistic and democratic values.¹⁹

Palacký also marks a careful distinction between the Hussite movement as spiritual, which he considers highly, and the destructiveness of the Hussite wars, which tore apart the country for fifteen years and which Palacký harshly criticises.²⁰ However, this did not prevent him from making admiring comments that the Hussite wars had been wars of ideas, and not of material interests.²¹

With respect to the distinction between anti-geopolitics and geopolitics, it is crucial that Palacký does not identify the most important moment in Czech history as its time of greatest territorial expansion (the Great Moravian state, or Bohemian Kingdom, under king Přemysl Otakar II), or with its greatest political influence (during the rule of Charles IV), as a geopolitical perspective would suggest. In contrast, he focuses on a period of civil war and foreign intervention which, however, was distinctive from the anti-geopolitical perspective as it brought about the reformation of the Church, thus contributing to the European tradition of democracy and humanity.

Why is this so? There is no easy answer. However, the prominence of anti-geopolitics could at least partly be explained with respect to the striving for national emancipation which was the main project of the late nineteenth century Czech elite. The geopolitical discourse of the day tended to either pan-Slavism or pan-Germanism and did not provide a good basis for Czech emancipation. While Germany represented the main other against which the Czech nationhood was constructed, the pan-Slavism associated with the Russian orthodox autocracy failed to provide an appropriate alternative. Moreover, the emerging German geopolitics was rather hostile to the political emancipation of small German neighbors. In this respect, a perspective which emphasised principles rather than size or force provided a more accommodating framework for the emancipation needs of a small nation which could not count on brute force.

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk: The Struggle with Positivism

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk was the political and intellectual leader of the Czech emancipation movement at the turn of the century, becoming the first Czechoslovak president after the creation of the state in 1918. Masaryk "modernized"²² Palacký's legacy to transform it into a political program,

which became the official ideology of the new Czechoslovak state.²³ His interpretation focuses on the anti-geopolitical features of Palacký's thinking, while downplaying his geopolitical reasoning.

Like Palacký, Masaryk considers the Czech reformation as the greatest achievement of Czech history. He argues that it introduced democratic ideas into Medieval Europe, conceptualising democracy in moral terms such as individual responsibility and self-limitation, which need no external enforcement.²⁴ By his understanding, democracy is opposed by theocracy, which he defines as the fusion of state and church into a single power hierarchy epitomised either by the dominance of the Catholic Church in the Austrian empire, or by the complete state control over the protestant churches in Prussian-led Germany. So the Czechs are seen as early pioneers of democracy, and their case for independence from Austria is basically argued from an ethical and normative perspective as the struggle of a democratic nation against a theocratic empire.

Masaryk also criticises those parts of Palacký's work which are more geopolitical. Although at first he acknowledges the geopolitical function of Austria, he later comes to the conclusion that it needs to be broken up because it is undemocratic. Furthermore, he is critical of the idea that Czech history can be understood as a struggle between Slavs and Germans, pointing to the positive aspects of Czech-German co-existence.²⁵ In general, he rejects thinking and politics based on the worship of power,²⁶ which is an inherent part of the geopolitical discourse.

Still, Masaryk himself is to some extent open to geopolitical interpretation, particularly his teleological understanding of history as a march from theocracy to democracy. In this respect, he interprets World War I as a fight of democracy (France, UK, and the USA) against theocracy (Austria and Germany), with the Czechs siding with democracy due to their tradition of religious reformation. In doing this, Masaryk strengthens the case for Czech independence, adding the pragmatic argument of being on the right side of the history to the ethical and normative arguments of being democratic.

However, as philosopher Jan Patočka observes, this introduction of the positivist, Comtian law of history undermines the rest of Masaryk's philosophy as it clashes with his moral and metaphysical understanding of democracy as focused on responsibility and agency.²⁷

Consequently, Masaryk's philosophy suffers from a deep contradiction of positivism and metaphysics. Moreover, as Gellner notes,²⁸ the positivist reading of Masaryk became quite important in the public discourse while the moral dimension, though essential for Masaryk, was marginalised. The positivist reading was geopolitical, arguing that "the Spirit of World History" (in the shape of a march to democracy) is located in the West, and therefore it makes sense for Czechs to ally with the Western powers. Thus by embracing positivist elements, Masaryk's basically anti-geopolitical conception allowed for a thoroughly geopolitical interpretation based on the contrast

between the East and the West. Moreover, this geopolitical interpretation proved destructive to democracy, making it quite easy to switch from the democratic West-orientated “Spirit of World History” to an East-orientated revolutionary communist Spirit.

Zdeněk Nejedlý: From Positivism to Marxism-Leninism

Zdeněk Nejedlý became infamous as the first communist minister of education, being responsible for the Stalinisation of Czechoslovak education and research in the late 1940s and 1950s. A historian and musicologist by background, he was the most prominent communist intellectual in Czechoslovakia. As a scholar he tried to reconcile the traditions of Czech political thinking and Marxism-Leninism, laying the groundwork for the official Czechoslovak communist ideology. In this respect, he drew both on Palacký, whom he admired, and on Masaryk, whom he acknowledged as his former mentor.

Marxism-Leninism is anti-geopolitical, rejecting any kind of geographical or cultural determinism and replacing it with the teleological determinism of world revolution leading to a classless society.²⁹ Given the anti-geopolitical nature of Palacký and Masaryk, the official rejection of geopolitics by the communists could easily relate to previous thinking. In this respect Nejedlý drew on Masaryk’s positivist side, replacing his liberal-democratic teleology with a revolutionary Marxist one. Nejedlý accepted the general framework of Masaryk’s interpretation of Czech history, focusing on the Hussites and their legacy. However, he did not interpret the Hussites as a religious reformation movement at the avant-garde of European democracy. In contrast, he saw them as a social, proto-communist movement.³⁰ With this connection, the Czechs could once more claim a distinguished heritage associating them with a grand historical force.

This anti-geopolitical argument was also supplemented with a more geopolitical line of argument. The Spirit of History (in the shape of the march towards a classless society) was located in the East, and on this basis the Czechs pragmatically chose an alliance with the Eastern power to be on history’s winning side. Moreover, Palacký’s geopolitical conception of Czech history as a struggle between Slavs and Germans seemed confirmed by two world wars and the alliance with the USSR (in its capacity as a geopolitical power) and made sense even for those who did not subscribe to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

Václav Havel: Almost Consistent Anti-Geopolitics

Václav Havel, playwright and former dissident, became the first post-communist Czechoslovak president in 1989. Throughout his presidency, Havel’s most important role model was Masaryk.³¹ Although Havel’s influence on the public discourse has never been as strong as Masaryk’s was,

he was very prominent in foreign policy, shaping the discourse and practice throughout the period of post-communist Czechoslovakia (1990–1992). For Havel, the core of Masaryk's legacy consists in the belief that politics must be based on morality.³² In this sense Havel, who was also significantly influenced by Patočka, draws on the metaphysical parts of Masaryk's theory, while putting aside his positivist philosophy of history.

Unlike Masaryk, Havel has not come up with a developed philosophical conception that provides the background for his policy. He has not put his trust "in overall historical theory, but in the eventual victory of simple decency".³³ In this sense, Havel has offered his personal credo of "Living in Truth", with which he fought against the communist regime and which is close to Masaryk's favoured slogan "Truth Prevails." While this made Havel less prone to geopolitical interpretation, it put him at odds with the prevailing common sense, costing him domestic political support.

In a completely anti-geopolitical manner, Havel defines the "spirit of our [Czechoslovak] foreign policy" as a campaign for human rights, their universality and indivisibility.³⁴ He argues that this policy has to be anchored in the moral awareness of individuals and in responsibility for the world as a whole. Therefore it cannot pursue the narrow interests of any particular country at the expense of others. Policy should understand its interests as a part of the common interest of mankind.

Thus he argues that Czechoslovakia participated in the Gulf War because of the indivisibility of freedom, and not to make Western allies happy. Similarly, he says that meeting with the Dalai Lama was worthwhile, despite the risk of annoying China and losing valuable contracts there. Also, refuting the usual templates of Czech geopolitical thinking, he calls for respect for "otherness",³⁵ equates anti-German feelings with anti-Semitism,³⁶ and rejects the idea of blocs and alliances, preferring an inclusive pan-European system.³⁷

Havel refers to geopolitical arguments far less frequently than his predecessors. However, he cannot completely avoid them either. He is aware that the principles he is fighting for are embedded in Western political thinking, so he does not hide his admiration for Western or "euro-atlantic" values, although this admiration is usually accompanied by a reflective criticism. This Western element is also present in his reflection on the Central European location of the Czech Republic, which is supposed to signal its belonging to the West.³⁸ However, this geopolitical feature should not be too surprising as it represents another connection with Havel's role model Masaryk.

CZECH GEOPOLITICIANS: LINGERING ON MARGINS

The above review of the four figures suggests that anti-geopolitics tends to prevail in the blend of geopolitics and anti-geopolitics within the mainstream of Czech political thinking (Table 1). However, this generally

TABLE 1 Czech political thinking between anti-geopolitics and geopolitics

	Anti-geopolitics	Geopolitics
Palacký	Hussite movement and its universalistic and humanistic legacy constitute the basis of modern Czech political existence.	Czechs have always been situated in the middle of an eternal struggle between Slavs and Germans. Austrian monarchy exists to provide a geopolitical shelter against Prussia and Russia.
Masaryk	Hussite democratic legacy fully justifies the existence of democratic Czechoslovakia. Austrian monarchy as an oppressive theocracy lost its justification.	Czechoslovakia belongs to the democratic West.
Nejedlý	Hussite revolutionary legacy fully justifies the existence of communist Czechoslovakia.	Czechoslovakia belongs to the Slavic East.
Havel	Czechoslovakia must not pursue its narrow self-interest. Instead, it has to actively promote universality and indivisibility of human freedom.	Czechoslovakia belongs to the democratic West.

anti-geopolitical mainstream has had its own geopolitical margins. And these were occasionally quite broad. In this respect, I focus on the work of two classics of Czech academic geopolitics, Viktor Dvorský (1882–1960) and Jaromír Korčák (1895–1989). Their work became influential for brief periods when reacting to the profound political changes of their time: the foundation of Czechoslovakia (1918) and destruction of Czechoslovakia (1938). However, this influence did not last and by now their work has fallen into almost complete disregard.

Viktor Dvorský: Czechoslovakia as a Newcomer on the Map

Even though the mainstream, shaped by Masaryk, justified Czechoslovakia's sovereign existence after 1918 with reference to the Czech tradition of democracy, the case for an independent Czechoslovakia was also argued from a geopolitical perspective. Viktor Dvorský, a leading geographer, member of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Versailles conference, and the founder of formal geopolitics in the Czech environment, provided these arguments.

Dvorský, who acknowledges his debt to Ratzel, turns against the Masaryk-dominated mainstream in several respects. First, geography and force rather than norms and ideas dominate history and politics. Second, the identity of the Czechoslovak nation does not stem from the Hussite

movement but from the Great Moravian state. Third, the tension between Czechs and Germans is basically irreconcilable.

Dvorský presents geopolitical reasoning as part of a new “science about states”, or “biology of nations”.³⁹ He is dismissive about international law in general and about the League of Nations in particular, particularly if they do not respect geography, arguing that borders change by force and not by law. Dvorský believes that territories are the true agents of history, having decisive influences upon the evolution of states, and it is “states that make nations” and “not nations that make states”.⁴⁰ Each territory has its natural boundaries; all formal borders are only temporary unless they correspond with natural ones. His discussion of borders is based on the distinction between basin states, whose centers are around rivers and their borders in mountains, and dorsal states, which occupy mountains and have their borders in valleys. Plainly, two neighboring entities of the same kind can easily agree on their shared borders, whether the mountains or the basin between them. However, basin states and dorsal states will have trouble existing side-by-side as basin states will seek their borders in the centers of dorsal states and vice versa.

With respect to Czechoslovakia, he sees it as a perfect geomorphologic unit with clear natural boundaries with Germany in the shape of mountains, and which is open to the Slavic East and the South-East.⁴¹ That is why the nation on the territory is Slavic and why Christianity came from Byzantium. The key national territories of the Czechoslovak nation are three basins: the Moldau-Elbe basin, the Morava-Thaia basin, and the Danubian basin. The Morava-Thaia basin gave rise to the Great Moravian state in the eighth century, where the Czechoslovak nation was born. After the Hungarian invasion in the tenth century the Great Moravian territory was split and the centre of the Czechoslovak nation moved to the Moldau-Elbe basin in the northwest, which was better protected by surrounding mountains. The Czechoslovak state with its center in Prague on the Moldau is thus “a restitution of the Great Moravian state in the same sense as current Italy is a restitution of the Roman Empire”.⁴²

Unlike Masaryk, Dvorský does not derive the modern Czechoslovak identity from the Hussite movement but rather from the Great Moravian state. In this respect he is rather critical about the Hussite reformation, as he argues that it destroyed religious and national unity, thus bringing about the end of the Bohemian kingdom. Moreover, the tension between Czechs and Germans is interpreted as a clash between basin and dorsal states rather than a clash between democracy and theocracy. Dvorský claims that the Czechoslovak western border is a place of tension between the German dorsal strategy (to draw the border inside the Elbe-Moldau basin), and the Czechoslovak basin strategy (to draw the border in the surrounding mountains). The Czech-German tension is thus seen as geographically inevitable.

Vladimír Korčák: Czechoslovakia Disappearing from the Map

Czechoslovakia's official, anti-geopolitical ideology was increasingly challenged in the late 1930s with the crisis of the Versailles system in Europe. Czechoslovakia had to face the threat of German aggression, to which it eventually succumbed. This crisis brought about a renewed interest in geopolitical thinking. At that time Jaromír Korčák, economic geographer and the founding father of Czech demographics, published a book which can be seen as the most elaborate scholarly contribution to Czech geopolitical thinking.⁴³

Korčák believed that the official Czechoslovak anti-geopolitical thought was unable to engage the geopolitical claims which doubted Czechoslovak sovereignty and territorial integrity, and which were based on proliferating German geopolitical literature.⁴⁴ His theory tried to remedy this. Korčák provides a geopolitical analysis of Central Europe that points out the geopolitical weakness of the region, the geopolitical unsustainability of the Austrian empire, and the natural shape of Czechoslovakia. However, his theory is also skeptical about the future of liberal democracy, praising some aspects of its totalitarian challengers.

Korčák considered himself a disciple of Dvorský. However, besides the Ratzelian influence,⁴⁵ Korčák also drew from the French geopolitical thinking,⁴⁶ which prompted his interest in human geography. This human dimension is strongly reflected in the central concepts of his theory. Thus he introduces the notion of the "tribal area" (*kmenová oblast*), which is a geographical area with a very long continuity of human settlement where a distinctive ethnic group had been formed under influence of both physical geography and migratory waves.⁴⁷ It serves as the "genetic kernel" of the nation. "Action centers" are established tribal areas with an especially high concentration of people. They influence their greater neighbourhoods emanating "geopolitical energy".⁴⁸ There are four such centers on the European continent: the Eastern Mediterranean, Italy, Western Europe (between the Rhine and the Seine) and the Baltics.

However, Central Europe, defined as the Central Danubian floodplain, has never been an action centre because it is sharply divided, lacking an integrating central area. This is the case because a large chunk of its territory actually does not fit in.⁴⁹ Korčák contends that Alföld, (the great plain East of the Danube containing most of Hungary's current territory) is completely different from the European plains that host European action centers. Geologically, it is comparable to the Asian steppes, which are not suitable for a sedentary life based on the cultivation of land. As a result, Alföld was inhabited by nomads for millennia, failing to develop sedentary life and European urban culture. Thus, instead of giving rise to a specific tribal area it served as a passage for the repeated Asian invasions that disturbed European progress. On this basis, Korčák argues that the basin is not a

natural geographical unit and, therefore political bodies which try to unify it, such as the Austrian empire, are doomed.

Still, there is a powerful tribal area in the Central Danubian floodplain, which is located at the intersection of several important passages. This is the Lower Morava River floodplain (the central part of Czechoslovakia, and northeastern part of Austria)—an important tribal centre since the Neolithic period⁵⁰ and tribal area of the Czechoslovak nation. This area gave rise to the Great Moravian state, which fell after the Avarian invasion from Alföld. The invasion brought about what Korčák calls “the greatest geopolitical loss” of Czechoslovak history,⁵¹ namely, the split of the Morava River floodplain in the eleventh century, whereby an important part of the area came under direct control of the Holy Roman Empire, becoming the cradle of the Austrian state.

However, drawing on Dvorský, Korčák identifies two other Czechoslovak tribal areas: the Elbe River Lowlands in Bohemia and the Danubian lowlands in Slovakia. Korčák argues that both tribal areas are very well connected with the Moravian tribal area, from both geographical and demographical perspectives. First, the mountains separating the areas are rather low and easy to pass. Korčák also claims that from Moravia it is even easier to connect with Slovakia than with Bohemia.⁵² Second, all three areas were connected by the Celtic inhabitation, making them receptive to later absorption by the Roman culture and by Slavic migration.

In this respect, he pictures Czechoslovakia as a natural geopolitical entity, whose appearance in 1918 is only the renewal of what had existed a millennium before and had been destroyed by Alföld. Similarly, he emphasises the connection between the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovakia, which was increasingly doubted in the late 1930s. However, the very same Alföld prevented the geopolitical unity of the Austrian empire, making it quite an artificial construction.

The admiration of physical force which comprises part of the geopolitical theorising of both Dvorský and Korčák translates into Korčák's ambiguity about Nazism. On the one hand, he sees Nazi Germany as a mortal threat to Czechoslovakia, while on the other hand he admiringly identifies Germany with the Baltic action center, which is the youngest and the most dynamic of the four European action centers.⁵³ Therefore Germany is also a source of inspiration as a new, dynamic Europe. In this respect, Alföld, which is seen as a negative influence in general, turns out to be beneficial. Korčák argues that the loosening of the links with West, brought about by Alföld, prevented Central Europe from developing some Western weaknesses connected with the “effeminacy of urban life and an excessive interest in material welfare”.⁵⁴ This makes Central Europe “young”, and able to learn from the mistakes of the West.

CZECH GEOPOLITICS AFTER THE SPLIT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Even though the Czech post-communist mainstream, shaped by Havel, was anti-geopolitical at first, the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 changed this. The split was preceded by a change in ruling elites. The former dissidents surrounding Václav Havel were succeeded by pragmatic economists led by Václav Klaus. Although their worldview was mainly shaped by neo-classical economics, they were much more open to geopolitical reasoning than the previous dissident elite.

Their brief embrace of geopolitics can be explained according to their need to differentiate themselves from the previous elite, which they criticised for neglecting Czech interests. Hence their geopolitics came into being as a negation of Havel's anti-geopolitics. However, this official geopolitics has taken over Havel's geopolitical arguments, calling for a rapid integration of the Czech Republic into Western political institutions. The focus on institutions then gradually replaced the original geopolitical focus. In contrast, a dissident geopolitical perspective also emerged, rejecting both Havel's anti-geopolitics and official geopolitics.

Official Geopolitics

The public discourses of prime minister Klaus and foreign minister Josef Zieleniec frequently relied on a variety of geopolitical arguments. This new discourse delimited itself against the Czech anti-geopolitical tradition. Thus, not only has Klaus often criticised Havel for his idealism, but he also took on Masaryk, reproaching him for focusing too much on normative theory without standing up for the national interest.⁵⁵ The definition of national interest was very much a matter of geopolitics, which the foreign minister saw as “the most important factor of foreign policy making.”⁵⁶

Despite these claims, the geopolitics of the new elite was not embedded in any systematic geopolitical theory. However, the geopolitical statements were a matter of political expediency, justifying the split of Czechoslovakia and demonstrating that the Czechs belonged in the West. It was thus claimed that after the split the Czech Republic re-orientated itself towards the West, losing contacts with the post-Soviet and Danubian spaces, making the state more stable and more transparent to the West.⁵⁷ Similarly, it is often emphasised that the Czechs “have been part of Western Europe for 1000 years, with the exception of 40 years”,⁵⁸ which is occasionally supported by a contestable claim that Christianity came from Rome, and not from Byzantium.⁵⁹ The Western orientation of the official geopolitics also included good relations with Germany, as Klaus proclaimed the St. Wenceslavian tradition (named after the Bohemian sovereign who strove for accommodation with the Holy Roman Empire) the basis of Czech national existence.⁶⁰

The official geopolitics also had support in academia. Bořek Hnízdo lecturer in political geography at Charles University, who introduced Anglo-American geopolitical theories to Czech students and researchers,⁶¹ provided several geopolitical arguments supporting official policy. Hence he argued that the Czech Republic is in Central Europe no matter how the region is defined, and that due to its location Central Europe has to be included in any scheme of pan-European integration.⁶² Similarly, he argued that the communist Eastern orientation was unusual in Czech history, and that it was Slovakia which drew the Czech lands to the East. Therefore, the split of Czechoslovakia was beneficial in bringing the country to the West. In this respect, he argued that the building of a new oil pipeline from Germany, and the connections to West European highways networks are likely to facilitate a “geopolitical transition” of the Czech Republic from an “East European” to a “West European” country.⁶³

Dissident Geopolitics

The official geopolitics neither developed any systematic theory, nor engaged the previous Czech geopolitical thinking—both these moves were made on the margins. This dissident geopolitics is largely connected with Oskar Krejčí, one of the most prolific Czech writers on international politics in the 1990s. Despite his rich publishing activity, Krejčí has been barred from any academic job in the Czech Republic since 1990 because of his close connections with the communist establishment and intelligence services in the 1970s and 1980s. In this respect, Krejčí represents that part of Czech society that perceives the fall of communism and transition to liberal democracy as a loss. This dissident background is also reflected in his theory. Krejčí sharply rejects both Havel’s anti-geopolitics and the official geopolitics. He sees both of them as pro-German ideologies jeopardising the very Czech national existence, which was seriously wounded by the split of Czechoslovakia.

Krejčí mainly draws upon the Czech geopolitical thinking of Dvorský and Korčák, while also presenting Palacký and Masaryk as geopoliticians.⁶⁴ His analysis of the Central European region relies on Korčák. Therefore, he pays great attention to the period from the tenth to the eleventh century when, “Czech statehood had taken its fundamental shape”, and when “fundamental geopolitical givens had arisen” which persist until the present day.⁶⁵

This period starts with the fall of the Great Moravian State after the Alföld incursion the late tenth century. Krejčí considers the Great Moravian state the greatest achievement of Czech history: the state controlled vital, pan-European merchant routes and was able to balance the German influence by intensive contacts with the Byzantine Empire. Its fall brought about several adverse effects, which shaped Czech statehood for centuries to

come. First, the core of the state shifted northwest from the Moravian tribal area, where conditions had been optimal, to the Elbe plain, which was harder to control and consolidate. Second, the Czech and Slovak territories were split. Third, the Hungarian-German alliance cut off the Czech state from the Byzantine Empire, making the German empire the exclusive focus of Czech politics. In the sixteenth century, Alföld again intervened. Under the Turkish threat, the Empire was centralised, and the Czech state completely lost its autonomy.

On the basis of his geopolitical reading of history, Krejčí identifies three traditional orientations for Czech foreign policy: German, Western and Eastern.⁶⁶ The German tradition is least desirable—it consists of embrace of pan-German ideology and the subordination of Czech interests to German ones. In contrast, the Eastern tradition fares best. Drawing on the Great Moravian connection with the Byzantine Empire, the tradition boils down to a quest in the East (Russia) for allies against Germany. The Eastern block, cemented by Slavic ideology or proletarian internationalism, is deemed unbeatable. The Western tradition is second best, to be applied only when the Eastern great power is too weak or when it allies with Germany itself.⁶⁷ It also balances against Germany, but does so by looking for allies behind Germany (France, UK).

Krejčí observes that after the split of Czechoslovakia and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic came inevitably into the German orbit. Krejčí bemoans that contemporary Russia is too weak and too distant to matter in Central Europe. In this connection, he claims that the current Czech political elite is unfit to pursue the national interest as it pushes the country further into German hands by rejecting a Slavic orientation, and by relying on France and Britain, which are weak, or on the USA, which ignores German dominance as long as it is not military.

Institutionalism

So can we conclude that Czech political and academic discourse is currently dominated by geopolitics? Not really. After its heyday in the early 1990s geopolitics faded away. No new geopolitical conceptions have appeared, and the ones that were presented were hardly elaborated upon. Geopolitics returned to its usual place in the margins. Instead, the Czech political discourse is dominated by a broadly defined institutionalism, connected with the study of and accession to NATO and the EU. Hence the focus is on institutional reforms, procedures, and policies rather than on the spatial dimension of international politics.

This is hardly surprising. A brief review of the Czech geopolitical thinking of Dvorský, Korčák and Krejčí showed that this kind of geopolitics is difficult to reconcile with the unquestioning respect for democracy and international law which constitutes Czech political thinking after 1989. Although the official geopolitics of the early 1990s did not draw on this

undemocratic tradition and, therefore, did not clash with democracy or international law, it did not develop any alternative concepts which would make it attractive, instead staying at the superficial level of political statements. Moreover, its main message that the Czech Republic is climbing out of the Danubian mess might have been good PR in 1992/1993, but it became redundant when most of the Danubian countries were also invited into NATO and the EU.

CONCLUSIONS

The embrace or rejection of geopolitics can be seen as a rejection or embrace of human agency. Czech political thinking has tended to be rather anti-geopolitical in stressing religious, moral, legal, or social perspectives. This tradition also emphasised freedom, responsibility, and agency at the expense of determinist constraints of the geopolitical kind. The best example of this focus is Palacký's interpretation of the Hussite movement, taken further by others, as a free expression of democratic ideals and a high point of Czech history.

Still, geopolitics has been an important undercurrent in Czech political thinking, coming to brief moments of dominance in times of turmoil. Czech geopolitics represents a determinist discourse drawing on the German geopolitical tradition. While anti-geopolitics celebrates the Hussite movement, most geopoliticians consider the Great Moravian State as the defining moment of Czech history. In their accounts geographical factors and quasi-natural migration patterns call all the shots, while agency is totally absent.

To sum up, in Czech political thinking, a discourse stressing human freedom and responsibility dominates in stable times, while a more determinist discourse takes over in times of turmoil. Moreover, given the revival of geopolitics in other post-communist countries⁶⁸ it can be argued that this link between a lack of political stability and a rise of geopolitics represents a more general phenomenon which can also be found elsewhere. Although the question as to why this is so has yet to be properly addressed, it may be argued that a return to geopolitics offers a return to the perceived certainties of a common sense whose particular construction is deeply ingrained in our modernity. Hence times of uncertainty may induce the embrace of geopolitics as a bulwark of certainty.

NOTES

1. The author would like to thank Gertjan Dijkink, Virginie Mamadouh, David Newman and four anonymous referees for their helpful comments. A draft version of this article was presented at the "Geopolitics as knowledge community" panel at the SGIR conference "Constructing World Orders", The

Hague, September 9–11, 2004. It has been written within a research project on “self-fulfilling geopolitics? An analysis of geopolitical thought in post Cold-War Europe” led by Stefano Guzzini.

2. There is a wide literature on Russian geopolitics in the 1990s. Cf. Ch. Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics,’ *Foreign Affairs* 78/2 (March/April 1999) pp. 9–13; V. Kolossov and R. Turovsky, ‘Russian Geopolitics at the Fin-de-siecle,’ *Geopolitics* 6/1 (2001) pp. 141–164; V. Kolossov, ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Geopolitics: Images of Foreign Countries in the Eyes of Russian Citizens,’ *Geopolitics* 8/1 (Spring 2003) pp. 121–148; S. Mäkinen, ‘On the Geopolitical Discourses of the Russian Yabloko Association, 1993–2001,’ *Geopolitics* 8/1 (Spring 2003) pp. 149–180; A. Ingram ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-fascism in Post-Soviet Russia,’ *Political Geography* 20 (2001) pp. 1029–1051; J. O’Loughlin, ‘Geopolitical Fantasies, National Strategies and Ordinary Russians in the Post-Communist Era,’ *Geopolitics* 5 (2001) pp. 17–48; J. O’Loughlin, G. Ó Tuathail and V. Kolossov, ‘Russian Geopolitical Storylines and Ordinary Russians in the Wake of 9–11,’ *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37 (2004) pp. 281–318; A. P. Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russian Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up,’ *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 35 (2003) pp. 101–127.

3. There are a few exceptions, though, linking geopolitics to new national identities constructions. See G. Dijkink, ‘The Empire of Revenge (Serbia),’ *National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride & Pain* (London and New York: Routledge 1996) pp. 109–118; E. Berg, ‘Some Unintended Consequences of Geopolitical Reasoning in Post-Soviet Estonia: Texts and Policy Streams, Maps, and Cartoons,’ *Geopolitics* 8/1 (Spring 2003) pp. 101–120; S. Moisisio, ‘EU Eligibility, Central Europe, and the Invention of Applicant State Narrative,’ *Geopolitics* 7/3 (Winter 2002) pp. 89–116; S. Wood, ‘A Common European Space? National Identity, Foreign Land Ownership and EU Enlargement: The Polish and Czech Cases,’ *Geopolitics* 9/3 (Autumn 2004) pp. 588–607.

4. Cf. V. D. Mamadouh, ‘Geopolitics in the Nineties: One Flag, Many Meanings,’ *GeoJournal* 46 (1998) pp. 237–253.

5. See H. van der Wusten and G. Dijkink, ‘German, British and French Geopolitics: The Enduring Differences,’ *Geopolitics* 7/3 (Winter 2002) p. 20.

6. Quoted in G. Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,’ in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London and New York: Routledge 1992/1998) p. 79.

7. See E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis* (London: Macmillan 1938).

8. Quoted in P. Routledge, ‘Anti-Geopolitics: Introduction,’ in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London and New York: Routledge 1998) pp. 245–255.

9. See G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically About Geopolitics,’ in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p. 10.

10. See G. Dijkink, *National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride & Pain* (London and New York: Routledge 1996) p. 103.

11. See J. Nijman, ‘Madeleine Albright and the Geopolitics of Europe,’ *GeoJournal* 46 (1998) p. 274.

12. Ibid. p. 276.

13. Guzzini shows that realism as a discipline of social research represents an attempt by Hans Morgenthau at translating what used to be common sense about European diplomacy into the language of American social science. See S. Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. the Continuing Story of a Death Foretold* (London, New York: Routledge 1998). This observation helps us understand the great extent to which the language of practitioners of international politics, and indeed of significant parts of IR research, is realist. See F. A. Beer and R. Harriman, ‘Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations,’ in F. A. Beer, and R. Harriman (eds.), *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 1996) pp. 6–7. Ó Tuathail makes a brief observation on the links between geopolitics, realism and common sense about international relations. See G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press 1996) pp. 168–169.

14. Quoted in G. Ó Tuathail, ‘and John Agnew Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,’ in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London and New York: Routledge 1992/1998) p. 79.

15. Geopolitics resonates very well with Cartesian modernity, offering a transparent ‘big picture’ of international politics, which fits into modernist attempts to understand human society in a scientific way. See G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press 1996); J. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London, New York: Routledge 1998).

16. This is analogical to the use of realist arguments in idealist writings, which often rely on a Hobbesian analysis of reality to demonstrate the necessity of their idealist solutions. Cf. E. Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace* (New York: Harper Brothers 1945).
17. See F. Palacký, *Dějiny národa českého v Čechách a v Moravě* (Prague 1907).
18. See L. Hrabová, 'Palacký a kontinuita dějin,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) p. 89.
19. See J. Válka, 'Palacký a francouzští liberální historikové,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) p. 95.
20. In this respect, he highly values Jan Hus, the spiritual father of the movement, while being rather ambiguous about Jan Žižka, the military leader of the Hussites. See P. Čornej, 'Ke genezi Palackého pojetí husitství,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) pp. 131–133.
21. See M. Bednář, 'Význam Palackého filosofické obnovy české státní ideje,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) p. 64 ; F. Palacký, 'Geschichte des Hussitentums und Prof. Constantin Höfler,' in *Kritische Studien* (Prague 1868) p. 65.
22. Quoted in Z. Šolle, 'Palacký, Masaryk, habsburská monarchie a střední Evropa,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) p. 473.
23. See E. Gellner, 'The Price of Velvet: Thomas Masaryk and Václav Havel,' *Czech Sociological Review*, 3/1 (1995) p. 49.
24. See T. G. Masaryk, *Světová revoluce* (Prague: Orbis 1925).
25. See J. Opat, 'TGM – pokračovatel v Palackého díle politickém,' in F. Šmahel and E. Doležalová (eds.), *František Palacký 1798/1998, dějiny a dnešek* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR 1999) pp. 349–360.
26. See T. G. Masaryk, *Světová revoluce* (Prague: Orbis 1925) pp. 410–420.
27. See J. Patočka, *Tři studie o Masarykovi* (Prague: Mladá fronta 1991).
28. See E. Gellner, 'The Price of Velvet: Thomas Masaryk and Václav Havel,' *Czech Sociological Review* 3/1 (1995) pp. 45–58.
29. The only book referring to geopolitics published in communist Czechoslovakia was a Czech translation of the Soviet book "Fascist geopolitics serving American imperialism". See J. N. Semjonov, *Fašistická geopolitika ve službách amerického imperialismu* (Prague: Naše vojsko 1951), Russian original: *Fašistskaja geopolitika na službce amerického imperialismu* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat 1949).
30. See Z. Nejedlý, *Velké osobnosti* (Prague: Mladá fronta 1951).
31. Masaryk is the person Havel referred to most frequently in his speeches during the 1990s. See V. Havel, *Projevy a jiné texty z let 1992–1999. Spisy VII* (Prague: Torst, 1999).
32. *Ibid.* p. 66.
33. See E. Gellner.
34. Quoted in V. Havel, *Letní přemítání. Spisy VI* (Prague: Torst 1999) p. 487.
35. Quoted in V. Havel, 'Z projevu prezidenta ČSFR Václava Havla na mezinárodní konferenci v Oslu o lidských právech a občanských svobodách (28.8.1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/7–9 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990) pp. 231–237.
36. See V. Havel, 'Projev prezidenta V. Havla na slavnostním shromáždění u příležitosti návštěvy prezidenta SRN Richarda von Weizsäckera v Československu (15.3.1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/1–3 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990c) pp. 37–42.
37. See V. Havel, 'Projev prezidenta V. Havla v Kongresu USA (21.2. 1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/1–3 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990) pp. 19–26 ; V. Havel, 'Vystoupení prezidenta Václava Havla v Bratislavě na setkání tří prezidentů – meetingu 90 (19.4.1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/4–6 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990) pp. 84–90.
38. See V. Havel, 'Projev prezidenta V. Havla v polském Sejmu (25.1. 1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/1–3 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990) pp. 9–14; V. Havel, 'Projev prezidenta V. Havla v Kongresu USA (21.2. 1990),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 37/1–3 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990) pp. 19–26.
39. Quoted in V. Dvorský, *Území československého národa* (Prague 1918) p. 63.
40. Quoted in V. Dvorský, *Základy politické geografie a československý stát* (Prague 1923) p. 19.
41. *Ibid.* p. 16–19.

42. Ibid. p. 22.
43. See J. Korčák, *Geopolitické základy Československa: Jeho kmenové oblasti* (Prague: Orbis 1938).
44. Ibid. p. 7.
45. See F. Ratzel, *Antropogeographie I* (4th ed.) (Stuttgart 1899/1921).
46. See P. Vidal de la Blache, 'Régions françaises,' *Revue de Paris* vol. 6 (Paris 1910); E. de Martonne, 'Europe Centrale I,' *Géographie Universelle* vol. 4 (Paris 1930); Demangeon, 'Géographie politique' *Annales de géographie* XLI (Paris 1932); J. Ancel, *Géopolitique* (Paris 1936); J. Brunhes, *Géographie humaine de la France* (Paris 1920).
47. See J. Korčák, *Geopolitické základy Československa: Jeho kmenové oblasti* (Prague: Orbis 1938) p. 16–17.
48. Ibid. p. 39–40.
49. Ibid. p. 45–47.
50. Ibid. p. 53.
51. Ibid. p. 101.
52. Ibid. p. 80.
53. Ibid. p. 158.
54. Ibid. p. 160.
55. See V. Klaus, 'Masaryk a jeho obraz v dnešní české společnosti,' *Conference T.G. Masaryk, idea demokracie a současné evropanství* (Prague, 2 March 2000).
56. Quoted in J. Zieleniec, 'Rozhovor ministra zahraničí Josefa Zieleniece pro Hospodářské noviny – Dva státy, dvě diplomacie (19.1. 1993),' *Česká zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 40/1 (Prague: Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993) pp. 74–79.
57. See J. Zieleniec, 'Rozhovor Národní obrody s ministrem mezinárodních vztahů ČR Josefem Zieleniecem – Aj po rozvodu si ostaneme blízki (6.10. 1992)' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 39/10 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992) pp. 885–888; J. Zieleniec, 'Rozhovor ministra zahraničí Josefa Zieleniece pro Hospodářské noviny – Dva státy, dvě diplomacie (19.1. 1993),' *Česká zahraniční politika dokumenty* 40/1 (Prague: Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993) pp. 74–79.
58. See J. Zieleniec, 'Rozhovor ministra mezinárodních vztahů ČR Josefa Zieleniece v Práci (29.9. 1992),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 39/9 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992) pp. 836–839.
59. See V. Klaus, 'Z projevu ministerského předsedy Václava Klause v Budči (26.9. 1992),' *Československá zahraniční politika – dokumenty* 39/9 (Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992) pp. 832–833.
60. Ibid.
61. See B. Hnízdo, *Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionů* (Prague: Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku 1995).
62. Ibid. p. 85.
63. Ibid. p. 96.
64. This, however, leads him to ignore the normative parts of their work, which clearly dominated their thinking. Krejčí's selective bias is strengthened by his focus on their contributions to the political discourse rather than on their scholarly works, where it is much more difficult to find traces of geopolitical thinking. The case for Palacký being a geopolitician rests mainly on his newspaper articles, open letters and pamphlets. In the case of Masaryk, Krejčí focuses on his publications from the time of World War I, rather than on his previous scholarly work. See O. Krejčí, *Český národní zájem a geopolitika* (Prague: Universe 1993) p. 63.
65. Ibid. p. 26
66. He uses the following labels: St. Wenceslavian, Masarykian and Slavic. Ibid. p. 120.
67. Ibid. p. 121.
68. See notes 2 and 3.

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